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Introduction 
This paper reports on the cultural 
adaptation ofAtlantic commercial fish­
ermen to the danger of their occupation 
and efforts to ameliorate that danger 
through safety training programs. The 
research is directed towards measuring 
fishermen's patterns of subjective per­
ceived danger and assessing the impact 
of safety training on these patterns of 
thinking. Safety training for commer­
cial fishermen has unique problems 
owing to a culture that relies heavily on 
the trivialization or denial of the dan­
gers associated with the work (Binkley, 
1995; Poggie et al., 1995, 1996; Pollnac 
et aI., 1995). Hence, understanding the 
efficacy of various approaches to safety 
training is important in promoting greater 
safety at sea, for this understanding will 
help create the most effective programs. 
Commercial fishermen participate in 
a demonstrably dangerous occupation. 
Their death rate is seven times the na­
tional average for all industrial groups 
(Macdonald and Powers, 1990:245). 
This well-documented danger is widely 
recognized by agencies and institutions 
concerned with safety policy and insur­
ance (Appave, 1990; Carter, 1990; 
MacDonald and Powers, 1990; Cana­
dian Coast Guard, 1987; National Re­
search Council, 1985). 
One of the problems noted by those 
concerned with fishing safety in the 
northeastern United States and eastern 
Canada is the tendency of many fisher­
men to trivialize or totally deny the dan­
gers associated with their occupation 
(Poggie and Pollnac, 1988; Poggie et 
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aI., 1995, 1996; Pollnac et aI., 1995; 
Binkley, 1991, 1995; McCay et al. l ). 
When they admit it, fishermen have a 
tendency to claim that danger affects 
other fishermen, but not them, because 
they are careful. Some actually are care­
ful, equipping their boats to the extent 
that they exceed Coast Guard safety 
standards. Many fishermen, however, 
simply do not allow themselves to think 
about the danger of their occupation, 
while others trivialize it. 
These patterns of denial and trivi­
alization have become part of the occu­
pational subculture offishermen and are 
reflected in patterned verbal comments 
we and other researchers have encoun­
tered in participant observation field­
work among them. For example, a num­
ber of fishermen have made statements 
to the effect that they have worked for 
years with no severe accidents and 
never expect to have one. Others state 
that fishing is no more dangerous than 
other occupations despite overwhelm­
ing. evidence to the contrary (personal 
observation). 
The strategy of denial and triviali­
zation may be psychologically adaptive, 
but it can result in fishermen who are 
poorly informed about the nature of the 
real dangers of their work. They are 
poorly informed because they refuse to 
search out, or even take seriously, in­
formation concerning the dangers of 
their occupation. Consequently, their 
I McCay, B. J., W. G. Gordon, E. B. Levine, J. 
B.Gatewood, B. Thompson, and C. Creed. 1989. 
From the waterfront: interviews with New Jer­
sey fishermen about marine safety and training. 
Project Report for New Jersey Marine Sciences 
Consortium, NJMSC-SK-89-1, 74 p. Unpub­
lished manuscnpts available from the authors c/o 
Dep. Sociol.-Anthrop., Univ. of Rhode Island 
Kingston, R.I. 02881. ' 
behavior may be inconsistent with the 
actual dangers of their occupation. Evi­
dence of this is provided by the fact that 
many fishermen carried little or no 
safety equipment before it became man­
dated by law. 
Although fishermen comply with the 
new safety regulations by acquiring the 
required safety equipment, there is evi­
dence that, in many cases, the compli­
ance is grudging and superficial at best. 
They frequently fail to take enough in­
terest to learn how to properly deploy 
the equipment or fail to maintain it ad­
equately. For example, Emergency Posi­
tion Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRB's) 
are required on all fishing vessels operat­
ing more than 3 miles from shore. Fish­
ermen purchase them because they are 
required to, but they fail to maintain or 
deploy them properly. Some fishermen 
reportedly keep their EPIRB's in a 
drawer in the cabin to protect them from 
theft but forget to place them back in 
the bracket when at sea; hence, if the 
vessel sinks, the EPIRB will sink with 
it and fail to operate as a locating bea­
con. One fisherman sadly told us that 
his brother lies dead under 30 fathoms 
of water with two EPIRB's stored in the 
cabin. Finally, EPIRB's require periodic 
testing and maintenance which some 
fishermen never perform. 
Similar types of improper use and 
deployment are associated with other 
required safety equipment (e.g. survival 
suits, survival craft, distress signals like 
flares and smoke signals, fire fighting 
equipment, etc.). Fishermen appear to 
trivialize the importance or deny the 
significance of safety equipment; hence, 
they do not search out information to 
learn to use and maintain it properly. 
It is very important to understand the 
subjective patterns of fishermen's per­
25 
ceptions of danger so that policy mak­
ers, safety trainers, and fishermen them­
selves may deal with this problem more 
realistically and thus increase the level 
of safety within the industry. Present 
increased efforts at educating fishermen 
about these dangers may be helpful if 
they actually change the way fishermen 
think about and behave in response to 
danger. 
Perceptions of Danger 
This study sets out to develop a 
method to measure and compare sub­
jective perceptions of danger between 
fishermen who have completed a safety 
training course with those who have not 
had such a course. The study uses a 
post-test-only design. The "experimen­
tal" group was composed of a sample 
of 35 northeastern U.S. fishermen who 
recently completed a 2-day vessel safety 
course at Ocean City, Md., given by 
vessel safety experts from the Univer­
sity of Rhode Island. The control group, 
a sample of 44 fishermen from New 
Bedford, Mass., did not take the 
course.2 
First, individuals in both groups were 
interviewed in terms of their subjective 
2 Power analysis was conducted to estimate ideal 
sample size for the New Bedford research (text 
footnote 3). Power refers to the probability of 
finding a statistically significant relationship in 
a sample when there is in fact a significant dif­
ference in the population. It is always possible 
that although there is a significant difference in 
the population, a specific sample will not result 
in a statistically significant finding. Since we 
want to increase the probability that the research 
design is strong enough to find a statistically sig­
nificant difference, if in fact one does exist, it is 
important to consider the concept "power" in de­
termining sample size (Cohen, 1988). The power 
analysis suggested a sample size of 44 for New 
Bedford. Power analysis was conducted to de­
termine the minimum sample size for the experi­
mental group (the fishing vessel safety trainees) 
with the following assumptions: I) a difference 
of at least 0.75 separates relevant groups on the 
dependent variable measures (three-fourths of a 
standardized factor score; 2) the standard devia­
tion for each group is estimated to be 1.0; 3) the 
alpha is set at 0.05, two-tail; 4) the desired power 
is 0.90. Analysis indicates that with a sample of 
44 in the control group, the sample size must be 
at least 34 in the experimental group in order for 
the power of the statistical design to be at least 
0.90. In other words, with the indicated sample 
sizes, the probability that any given sample would 
have differences which are statistically signifi­
cant is .90 when in fact there is a significant dif­
ference in the population. Conversely, it means 
that there is one chance in ten that the test on the 
sample will not be statistically significant, when in 
ranking, on a scale of 1 to 10, of the 
danger involved in fifteen fishing inci­
dents that vary in frequency of occur­
rence and severity ofoutcome. The con­
text (season, weather, and seas) of the 
fifteen situations posed was that they 
were fishing at their normal distance 
from shore in mid-February, with sus­
tained winds of 25 knots and 6- to 10­
foot seas. This contextual information 
was provided to standardize the hypo­
thetical conditions under which each 
respondent evaluated the relative dan­
gers of the fifteen incidents. The list of 
incidents (Table 1) was derived from 
Coast Guard reports and key informants 
from the region. 
The next step in the research is based 
on the assumption that covariance in the 
perception of relative danger of specific 
fishing incidents can be used to define 
sets of incidents which engender simi­
lar patterns-of-worry responses. These 
sets of incidents can then be treated as 
a single variable-a scale composed of 
the weighted sum of responses to the 
incidents. Principal component factor 
analysis with varimax rotation of fac­
tors was used to determine patterns in 
variability in responses to the 15 inci­
fact there is a significant difference in the popula­
tion. Since questionnaires were handed out to all 
trainees, and 35 usable forms were returned, the 
experimental group is slightly greater than the 
planned sample size. This, of course, increases the 
power of the research design. 
Ideally, the experimental and control groups 
should be matched on all important variables 
except participation in the training session. Since 
the trainees were a self-selected group, this was 
not possible, but it is possible to compare the two 
groups with respect to three variables that may 
influence perceptions of relative risk (fishing 
type, vessel size, and distance from shore of fish­
ing activity). These data are presented to enable 
readers to evaluate potential threats to validity 
as well as to structure needed future research on 
this topic. Fishing type varied between the two 
groups, with the control group (New Bedford) 
being characterized by a preponderance of 
scallopers and draggers and the trainees mostly 
longliners and sea clammers with some draggers. 
Vessel length also distinguished the two groups, 
with the controls having longer vessels (mean 
92.9 ft, s.d. 18.2) compared to the trainees (mean 
68.7 ft, S.d. 25.0), a difference which is statisti­
cally significant (t = 5.33, P < 0.001). However, 
we found no statistically significant correlations 
between vessel length and any of the three Worry 
Factors. Distance normally fished from shore and 
maximum distance fished from shore do not dis­
tinguish the controls from the trainees (mean 
182.6 mi, s.d. 153.5 versus 118.7 mi, S.d. 284.5, t = 
1.31, P> 0.05 and 281.7 mi, S.d. 203.3 versus 218.7 
mi, s.d. 451.1, t =0.81, P> 0.05, respectively). 
Table 1.-Principal component analysis of incident 
evaluations. Boldface type indicates highest loadings 
on each factor. 
WORRY FACTOR 
Incident Type 2 3 
Lose all electronics. .86 .02 .02 
Engine failure. .83 .20 .21 
Lose ability to steer the boat. .79 .14 .04 
Fog, visibility less than 50 feet. .68 -.34 .37 
Pull a bomb-like object in gear. .63 .19 .21 
Flood (pumps unable to keep up). .58 .41 .25 
Flood (pumps able to keep up). .53 .37 .34 
Fire in the engine room. .51 .47 .44 
Explosion in the engine room. -.12 .81 .23 
Fall overboard. .24 .69 -.18 
Struck amidship by another boat. .25 .62 .32 
Several inches of ice in rigging. .12 -.07 .80 
Gear hung-up on the bottom. .06 .17 .67 
Fire in the galley. .34 .39 .61 
Fall and break a bone in arm or leg. .40 .12 .46 
Cumulative percent of variance 28 44 60 
dent types. The scree-test, which limits 
factors derived on the basis of a level­
ing-out of eigenvalues, was used to de­
fine a number of factors. The results of 
this analysis are also shown in Table 1. 
The three factors derived from the 
principal component analysis are re­
ferred to as WORRYl, WORRY2, and 
WORRY3. The analysis appears to have 
grouped the incidents in terms of po­
tential severity. Those with high load­
ings on WORRY2 are the most severe 
types of incidents (e.g. explosion in 
engine room, falling overboard, colli­
sion at sea). WORRYl and 3 are com­
posed of incidents of less severity, with 
those on WORRY3 (e.g. ice in the rig­
ging, fire in the galley) having poten­
tially more immediate cOl1sequences 
than incidents loading highest on 
WORRYI (e.g. loss of electronics or 
engine failure). The incidents in Table 
1 for which the factor loadings are in 
bold print indicate the ones with the 
highest loadings on each factor. That 
does not mean, however, that a given 
incident does not also have a relatively 
high loading on another factor. Fire in 
the engine room has relatively high 
loadings on all three factors, indicating 
that it could be quite dangerous with 
immediate impact (WORRY2 and 
WORRY3), yet in some cases could be 
handled easily (WORRYl). Flooding 
with pumps unable to keep up, has high 
loading on WORRY2 as well as on 
WORRYl, on which it loads highest. 
The relative sizes of these loadings are 
reflected in the standardized factor 
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scores calculated for the scales devel­
oped from the three factors. Hence, a 
fisherman with a high factor score for 
WORRYI manifested a higher degree 
ofconcern with incidents loading highly 
on factor I than fishermen with lower 
factor scores. 
Safety Training and
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The profiles provided by the factor 
loadings and the factor scores give us a 
picture of how danger is perceived by 
the overall sample, as well as a mea­
sure of individual variability in concern. 
The individual-level independent vari­
able of interest in the design of this 
study is whether a fisherman has com­
pleted or not completed the safety train­
ing course conducted by personnel from 
the University of Rhode Island. We wish 
to determine if there is a relationship 
between having taken the safety train­
ing course and differences in concerns 
as to dangers of the occupation as mea­
sured in this analysis. 
Analysis of the relationship between 
the control and experimental groups and 
the three worry factors are presented in 
Table 2. As indicated by higher mean 
factor scores, individuals in the experi­
mental group are more concerned with 
the dangers in WORRY3. There are no 
significant differences in the patterns on 
WORRYI and WORRY2. 
Discussion 
Based on the evidence in hand, we 
may conclude that the safety training 
course has heightened the concern 
among fishermen in our experimental 
group regarding Worry Factor 3. The 
items that define this factor are: ice in 
the rigging, gear hung-up on ocean bot­
tom, fire in the galley, and fall and break 
a bone in arm or leg. These items are 
judged to be intermediate in their dan­
gerousness (compared to the highest 
Table 2.-Relationship of control-experimental to worry 
factors. 
Mean Factor Scores 
Item WORRY1 WORRY2 WORRY3 n 
Control 
Experimental 
t-value 
Probability 
.18 
-.22 
1.79 
>.05 
-.02 
.03 
-0.22 
>.05 
-.35 
.44 
-3.79 
<.001 
44 
35 
79 
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loading items in WORRYI and 2) and 
can be dealt with, given proper sensiti­
zation, preparation, and response. We 
tum to a description of the course which 
appears to have brought about this 
change in perception. 
The safety training taken by the ex­
perimental group was a 2-day course 
that began with an effort to sensitize 
fishermen to the dangers of their occu­
pation. Films of three actual events of 
capsizing, colliding, and being swamped 
by a big wave were shown to fishermen 
at the beginning of the first day of the 
class. The consequences of the three 
events shown in the film were cata­
strophic in that they clearly involved the 
loss of life and property. Two of the 
events, the big wave and the capsizing, 
were both related to stability of the ves­
sels and could have been prevented with 
proper preparation and response. The 
mistake involved in the collision was 
due to the improper use of radar. Be­
cause of this mistake, the two fishing 
boats involved collided even though 
they were both in full reverse. When the 
colliding vessel's bow backed out of the 
middle of the second vessel, it left a 
gaping hole; which resulted in the sec­
ond vessel sinking within two minutes­
insufficient time for crew members to use 
immersion suits or deploy life rafts. 
The rationale for showing fishermen 
these real events of loss at sea was to 
illustrate to them the considerable dan­
gers involved in their work and to mo­
tivate them to take the course material 
seriously. Based on the growing knowl­
edge of fishermen's adaptation to the 
dangers of their work, we would argue 
that this aspect of the safety training 
course helps to overcome the tendency 
to trivialize and deny danger that is a 
common feature of the subculture of 
commercial oceanic fishing in the At­
lantic region (Binkley, 1991, 1995; 
Pollnac et aI., 1995; Poggie et aI., 1996). 
The course proceeded with a general 
overview of safety issues. It continued 
with more specific information on 
safety equipment and procedures such 
as emergency communications, flares, 
and distress signals; personal flotation; 
damage control and minimizing flood­
ing; and fire prevention and control. The 
course continued with actual practice at 
firefighting, raft launching, flood con­
trol, donning an immersion suit, etc. The 
course concluded with training on how 
to conduct a drill and involved actual 
drill practice in a range of distress situ­
ations. Following the drill practice, a 
debriefing took place. The research 
questionnaire was administered at the 
conclusion of the debriefing. 
Overall, this analysis indicates that 
the training course resulted in trainees 
manifesting more caution with respect 
to only one of the three Worry Factors. 
The fact that only one factor was sig­
nificantly related to training should not 
be construed as indicating that the train­
ing is marginally effective. As reported 
in an earlier analysis of these items 
(Pollnac et al.3), all fishermen are equally 
cautious with respect to items in WOR­
RY2, and items in WORRYI are fre­
quently dealt with by competent captains 
and crew. The items in WORRY3 are 
serious, but were probably not per­
ceived in all their seriousness until the 
training sessions heightened awareness. 
This finding would be useful in design­
ing future training sessions for other 
fishermen. The training session exam­
ined in this analysis can be related to 
changing perceptions which may help 
save lives in the future of the fishermen 
who completed the course. 
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